The framework of algorithmic knowledge assumes that agents use deterministic knowledge algorithms to compute the facts they explicitly know. We extend the framework to allow for randomized knowledge algorithms. We then characterize the information provided by a randomized knowledge algorithm when its answers have some probability of being incorrect. We formalize this information in terms of evidence; a randomized knowledge algorithm returning "Yes" to a query about a fact ~o provides evidence for qo being true. Finally, we discuss the extent to which this evidence can be used as a basis for decisions.
Introduction
Under the standard possible-worlds interpretation of knowledge, which goes back to Hinfikka [ 1962] , an agent knows qo if ~o is true at all the worlds the agent considers possible. This interpretation of knowledge has been found useful in capturing some important intuitions in the analysis of distributed protocols [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] . However, its usefulness is somewhat limited by what Hintikka [1962] called the logical omniscience problem: agents know all tautologies and know all logical consequences of their knowledge. Many approaches have been developed to deal with the logical omniscience problem (see [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995, Chapter 10 and 11] for a discussion and survey). We focus on one approach here that has been called algorithmic knowledge [Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1994] . The idea is simply to assume that agents are equipped with "knowledge algorithms" that they use to compute what they know. An agent algorithmically knows ~ if its knowledge algorithm says "Yes" when asked qo. 1 the evidence provided by knowledge algorithms with other kind of evidence already accumulated for a formula, obtained for example by running other kinds of tests, and look at the combined evidence. We do not consider evidence in such a general setting in this paper; rather, we focus on the evidence contributed specifically by a randomized knowledge algorithm. Our companion paper [Halpern and Pucella 2003 ] provides a treatment of evidence in a more general setting.
Reasoning about knowledge and algorithmic knowledge
The aim is to be able to reason about properties of systems involving the knowledge of agents in the system. To formalize this type of reasoning, we first need a language. The syntax for a multiagent logic of knowledge is straightforward. Starting with a set • of primitive propositions, which we can think of as describing basic facts about the system, such as "the door is closed" or "agent A sent the message m to B", more complicated formulas are formed by closing off under negation, conjunction, and the modal operators K1 ..... Kn and X1, • •., Xn. Thus, if ~o and ~b are formulas, then so are ~, ~o A ¢, Kilo (read "agent i knows ~o"), and X~o (read "agent i can compute ~").
The standard possible-worlds semantics for knowledge uses Kripke structures [Kripke 1963 ].
Formally, a Kripke structure is composed of a set S of states or possible worlds, an interpretation 7r which associates with each state in S a truth assignment to the primitive propositions (i.e., 7r(s)(p) E {true, false} for each state s E S and each primitive proposition p), and equivalence relations ~i on S (recall that an equivalence relation is a binary relation which is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive). The relation ~i is agent i's possibility relation. Intuitively, s ~i t if agent i cannot distinguish state s from state t (so that if s is the actual state of the world, agent i would consider t a possible state of the world). For our purposes, the equivalence relations are obtained by taking a set £ of local states, and giving each agent a view of the state, that is, a function Li : S ~ £. We define s ~i tiff Li(s) = Li(t). In other words, agent i considers the states s and t indistinguishable if he has the same local state at both states.
To interpret explicit knowledge of the form Xi~o, we assign to each agent a knowledge algorithm that the agent can use to determine whether he knows a particular formula. A knowledge algorithm h takes as inputs a formula of the logic and a local state g in £. It is required to be deterministic and terminate on all inputs, with result "Yes", "No", or "?". An algorithmic knowledge structure M is a tuple (S, 7r, L 1 , . . . , Ln, h l , -. . , An), where L i , . • •, Ln are the view functions on the states, and h l , . . . , An are knowledge algorithms. 2 We define what it means for a formula ~o to be true (or satisfied) at a state s in an algorithmic knowledge structure M, written (M, s) ~ ~o, inductively as follows: [1994] introduced algorithmic knowledge in the context of dynamic systems, that is, systems evolving in time. In addition, the knowledge algorithm is allowed to change at every state of the system. Since the issues that interest us do not involve time, we do not consider dynamic systems in this paper. We remark that what we are calling "algorithmic knowledge structures" here are called "algorithmic structures" in [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995; Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1994] . The term "algorithmic knowledge structures" will be used in the second edition of [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] . The first clause shows how we use the 7r to define the semantics of the primitive propositions. The next two clauses, which define the semantics of-~ and A, are the standard clauses from propositional logic. The fourth clause is designed to capture the intuition that agent i knows qo exactly if qa is true in all the states that i considers possible. The final clause interprets Xi~ via agent i's knowledge algorithm. Thus, agent i has algorithmic knowledge of qo at a given state ff the agent's algorithm outputs "Yes" when presented with qo and with the agent's local state. (Both the outputs "No" and "?" result in lack of algorithmic knowledge.) As usual, we say that a formula qo is valid in structure M if (M, s) ~ ~p for all states s E S; ~ is valid if it is valid in all structures.
We can think of Ki as representing implicit knowledge, facts that the agent implicitly knows, given its information. One can check that implicit knowledge is closed under implication, that is, Kiqo A Ki(~ ~ ~b) =¢, Ki,~ is valid, and that an agent implicitly knows all valid formulas, so that if qo is valid, then Kip is valid. These properties say that agents are very powerful reasoners. What is worse, while it is possible to change some properties of knowledge by changing the properties of the relation Ni, no matter how we change it, we still get closure under implication and knowledge of valid formulas as properties. They seem to be inescapable features of the possible-worlds approach. This suggests that the possible-worlds approach is appropriate only for "ideal knowers", ones that know all valid formulas as well as all logical consequences of their knowledge, and thus inappropriate for reasoning about agents that are computationally limited. In contrast, Xi represents explicit knowledge, facts whose truth the agent can compute explicitly. Since we put no a prior restrictions on the knowledge algorithms, an agent can explicitly know both ~ and qo =v ~b without explicitly knowing ~b, for example.
As defined, there is no necessary connection between Xiqo and Kiqo. An algorithm could very well claim that agent i knows qa (i.e., output "Yes") whenever it chooses to, including at states where Kiqo does not hold. Although algorithms that make mistakes are common, we are often interested in knowledge algorithms that are correct. We say that a knowledge alggrithm is sound for agent i in the structure M if for all states s of M and formulas qa, lti(qa, Li(s)) = "Yes" implies ( M, s) ~ Kilo, ~md hi( qo, Li( s ) ) = "No" implies ( M, s) ~ ~Kiqo. Thus, a knowledge algorithm is sound if its definite answers are correct. If we restrict attention to sound algorithms, then algorithmic knowledge can be viewed as an instance of awareness, as defined by Fagin and Halpem [i988] .
Randomized knowledge algorithms
Randomized knowledge algorithms arise frequently in the literature (although they have typically not been viewed as knowledge algorithms). In order to deal with randomized algorithms in our framework, we need to address a technical question. Randomized algorithms are possibly nondeterminisfic; they may not yield the same result on every invocation with the same arguments. Since XiV holds at a state s if the knowledge algorithm answers "Yes" at that state, this means that, with the semantics of the previous section, Xiqa would not be well defined. Whether it holds at agiven state depends on the outcome of random choices made by the algorithm. However, we expect the semantics to unambiguously declare a formula either true or false. We deal with the problem by adding information to the semantic model to resolve the uncertainty. Observe that if the knowledge algorithm A is randomized, then the answer that A gives on input (qo, ~) will depend on the outcome of coin tosses (or whatever other randomizing device is used by h). We thus turn the randomized algorithm into a deterministic algorithm by supplying it with an appropriate argument. For example, we supply an algorithm that makes random choices by tossing coins a sequence of outcomes of coin tosses. We can now interpret a knowledge algorithm answering "Yes" with probability a at a state by consider the probability of those sequences of coin tosses at the state that make the algorithm answer "Yes".
Formally, we start with an algorithmic knowledge structure M = (S, 7r, L1, • • •, Ln, A1, • • •, An).
For simplicity, assume that the randomness in the knowledge algorithms comes from tossing coins.
A derandomizer is a tuple v = (vx,... ,Vn) such that for every agent i, vi is a sequence of outcomes of coin tosses (heads and tails). There is a separate sequence of coin tosses for each agent rather than just a single sequence of coin tosses, since we do not want to assume that all agents use the same coin. Let V be the set of all such derandomizers. To every randomized algorithm h we associate a derandomized algorithm h d which takes as input not just the query qa and local state g, but also the sequence vi of i's coin tosses, taken from a derandomizer (Vl,..., vn). A probabilistic algorithmic knowledge structure extending M = (S, rr, L 1 , . . . , Ln, h i , . . . , An) is a tuple M' = (S, 7r, L 1 , . . . , L~, Ala,..., A,'~, v), where v is a probability distribution on V and h/d is the derandomized version of h~. (Note that in a probabilistic algorithmic knowledge structure the knowledge algorithms are in fact deterministic.) Because we do not impose any i'estriction on the distribution u, we do not require that the coin be fair or that the tosses be independent. We can in fact capture correlation between the agents' coins by using an appropriate distribution v.
The truth of a formula is now determined relative to a pair (s, v) consisting of a state s and a derandomizer v. We abuse notation and continue to call these pairs states. The semantics of formulas in a probabilistic algorithmic knowledge structure is a straightforward extension of their semantics in algorithmic knowledge structures. The semantics of primitive propositions is given by 7r; conjunctions and negations are interpreted as usual; for knowledge and algorithmic knowledge, Here, h/d gets v~ as part of its input, hid(to, g, vl) is interpreted as the output of hid given that vi describes the results of the coin tosses. Having the sequence of coin tosses as part of the input allows us to talk about the probability that i's algorithm answers yes to the query ~p at a local state g.
It is simply v({v : h/a(qo, g, vi) = "Yes"}). To capture this in the language, we extend the language to allow formulas of the form Pr(~p) > oL, read "the probability of ~p is at least og'. The semantics of such formulas is straightforward:
Note that the truth of Pr(qo) >_ c~ at a state (s, v) is independent of v. Thus, we can abuse notation and write (M', s) ~ Pr(qo) > a. In particular, (M', s) ~ Pr(Xiqo) < a (or, equivalently, (M ~, s) ~ Pr(--,Xiqo) > 1 -a) if the probability of the knowledge algorithm returning "Yes" on a query qa is less than a, given agent i's local state at state s.
If all the knowledge algorithms used are deterministic, then this semantics agrees with the semantics given in Section 2. To make this precise, note that if h is deterministic, then hd(~o, ~, vi) = hd(~o, g, v~) for all v, v' E V. In this case, we abuse notation and write h(qo, ~). Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 justify the decision to "factor out" the randomization of the knowledge algorithms into semantic objects that are distinct from the states; the semantics of formulas that do not depend on the randomized choices do not in fact depend on those additional semantic objects.
An example from security
As we mentioned in the introduction, an important area of application for algorithmic knowledge is the analysis of cryptographic protocols. In previous work [Halpern and Pucella 2002] , we showed how algorithmic knowledge can be used to model the resource limitations of an adversary. We briefly review the framework of that paper here.
Participants in a security protocol are viewed as exchanging messages in the free algebra generated by a set ~t~ of plalntexts and a set/C of keys, over abstract operations • (concatenation) and ] (eneryption). The set .hA of messages is the smallest set that contains/C and P and is closed under encryptiorL and concatenation, so that if rnl and rn2 are in .A4 and k E /C, then ml • rn~ and ~rnl]k are in A4. We identify elements of A4 under the equivalence O~rn]k~k-1 = m. We make the standard assumption that concatenation and encryption have enough redundancy to recognize that a term is in fact a concatenation ml • m2 or an encryption ~rrl)k.
-......
In an algoritJkmic security structure, some of the agents are participants in the security protocol being modeled, while other agents are adversaries that do not participate in the protocol, but attempt to subvert it. The adversary is viewed as just another agent, whose local state contains all the messages it has intercepted, as well as the keys initially known to the adversary, such as the public keys of all the agents. We use initkey(#) to denote the set of initial keys known by an agent with local state # and write recv(rn) E E if rn is one of the messages received (or intercepted in the case of the adversary) by an agent with local state ~. We assume that the language includes a primitive proposition hasi(rn) for every message m, essentially saying that message m is contained within a message that agent i has received. (We omit the formal definition of containment here; see [Halpern and Pucella 2002] .)
Clearly, the adversary may not explicitly know that he has a given message if that message is encrypted using a key that the adversary does not know. To capture these restrictions, Dolev and Yao [1983] gave a now-standard description of capabilities of adversaries. Succinctly, a Dolev-Yao adversary can compose messages, replay them, or decipher them if he knows the fight keys, but cannot otherwise "crack" encrypted messages. The Dolev-Yao model can be formalized by a relation H ~oY rn between a set H of messages and a message m. (Our formalization is equivalent to many other formalizations of Dolev-Yao in the literature, and is similar in spirit to that of Paulson [1998] .) Intuitively, H ~-DY m means that an adversary can "extract" message m from a set of received messages and keys H, using the allowable operations. The derivation is defined using the following inference rules:
where k -1 represents the key used to decrypt messages encrypted with k. We can encode these capabilities via a knowledge algorithm A DY for the adversary as agent i. The details can be found in [Halpern and Pucella 2002] , where it is also shown that this algorithm does indeed capture the Dolev-Yao adversary in the following sense: The Dolev-Yao algorithm is deterministic. It does not capture, for example, an adversary who guesses keys in an effort to crack an encryption. Assume that the key space consists of N keys, and let #uesskeys(n) return n of these, chosen uniformly at random. Let A~ Y-I-rg(rt) be the result of modifying A~ v to take random guessing into account (the rg stands for random guess). Using A~ Y+rg("), the adversary gets to work with whatever keys it already had available, all the keys it can obtain using the standard Dolev-Yao algorithm, and the additional n randomly chosen keys returned by guesskeys(n). We omit the straightforward formal details here.
Of course, if the total number N of keys is large relative to n, making n random guesses should not help much. Our framework lets us make this precise.
Proposition 4.2: Suppose that M' = ( S, 7r, Li, . . . , Ln, A1 d .... , ltan, v) is a probabilistic algorithmic security structure with an adversary as agent i and that Ai = A~ v+rg°~) Let If be the number of distinct keys used in the messages in the adversary's local state £ (that is, the number of keys used in the messages that the adversary has intercepted at a state s with Li (s) = ~). Suppose that KIN < i/2 and that v is the uniform distribution on sequences of coin tosses. If Proposition 4.2 says that what we expect to be true is in fact true: random guessing of keys is sound, but it does not help much (at least, if the number of keys guessed is a small fraction of the total numbers of keys). If it is possible that the adversary does not have algorithmic knowledge of m, then the probability that it has algonthmic knowledge is low. While this result just formalizes our intuitions, it does show that the probabilistic algorithmic knowledge framework has the resources to formalize these intuitions naturally.
Probabilistic algorithmic knowledge
While the "guessing" extension of the Dolev-Yao algorithm considered in the previous section is sound, we are often interested in randomized knowledge algorithms that may sometimes make mistakes. For example, suppose that Alice has in her local state a number n > 2. Let prime be a proposition true at state s if and only if the number n in Alice's local state is prime. Clearly, Alice either (implicitly) knows prime or knows ~prime. However, this is implicit knowledge. Suppose that Alice uses Rabin's [1980] pfimality-testing algorithm to test if n is prime. That algorithm Uses a (polynomial-time computable) predicate P(n, a) with the following properties, for a natural number n and I < a < n -1:
(1) P(n, a) E {0, 1}, n (2) ifn is composite, P(n, a) = 1 for at least ~ choices of a,
(3) if n is prime, P(n, a) = 0 for all a.
Thus, Alice uses the following randomized knowledge algorithm AAlice: when queried about prime, the algorithm picks a number a at random between 0 and the number n in Alice's local state; if P(n, a) = 1, it says "No" and if P(n, a) = 0, it says "Yes". (It is irrelevant for our purposes what the algorithm does on other queries.)
It is not hard to check that AAlice has the following properties: If the number n in Alice's local state is prime, then AAlie e answers "Yes" to a query prime with probability 1 (and hence "No" to the same query 'with probability 0). If n is composite, AAli~e answers "Yes" to a query prime with probability < ½ and "No" with probability > ½. Thus, ifn is composite, there is a chance that AAlic e will make a mistake, although we can make the probability of error arbitrarily small by applying the algorithm repeatedly.
Randomized knowledge algorithms like this are quite common in the literature. They are not sound, but are "almost sound". The question is what we can learn from such an "almost sound" algorithm. Note that we know the probability that AAlice says "Yes" given that n is prime; what we are interested in is the probability that n is prime given that AAli~ says "Yes". (Of course, n is either prime or not. However, if Alice has to make decisions based on whether n is prime, it seems reasonable for her to ascribe a subjective probability to n's being prime. It is this subjective probability that we are referring to here.)
Bayes' rule lells us that Pr(n is prime [ AAlic e says "Yes") = Pr(AAlice says "Yes" [ n is pfime)Pr(n is prime) Pr(AAUce says "Yes")
The only piece of information in this equation that we have is Pr(AAliee says "Yes" [ n is prime). If we had Pr(n is prime), we could derive Pr(AAlice says "Yes"). However, we do not have that information, since we did not assume a probability distribution on the number in Alice's local state.
Although we do not have the information needed to compute Pr(n is prime [ AAlie e says "Yes"), there is still a strong intuition that if X~o holds, this tells us something about whether the number is prime or not. How can this be formalized?
Evidence
Intuitively, the fact that X/qo holds provides "evidence" that qo holds. But what is evidence? There are a number of definitions in the literature. They all essentially give a way to assign a "weight" to different hypotheses based on an observation; they differ in exactly how they assign the weight (see [Kyburg 1983 ] for a survey). Some of these approaches make sense only if there is a probability distribution on the hypotheses. Since this is typically not the case in the applications of interest to us (for example, in the pnmality example, we do not want to assume a probability on the input n), we use a definition of evidence given by Shafer [1982] and Walley [1987] , which does not presume a probability on hypotheses. For simplicity, we assume here that the set of hypotheses of interest has the form 7-/= {h0, ~}. The hypothesis ho is the negation of hypothesis ho. For example, if ho is "n is prime", then ho is "n is not prime". We are given a set O of observations, which can be understood as outcomes of experiments that we can make. Assume that for each hypotheses h E 7-/there is a probability space (O, 2 °, #h). Intuitively, #h(ob) is the probability of ob given that hypothesis h holds. While this looks like a conditional probability, notice that it does not require a probability on 7-/. Define an evidence space to be a tuple E = (7-/, O, #hol #~o) where 7"/, O, #ho, and #~o are as above.
For an evidence space E, the weight that the observation ob lends to hypothesis h E 7Y, written we(oh, h) or simply w(ob, h) when E is understood, is
wc(ob, h) ~ #h(ob) #ho ( Ob ) + #~'( ob ) "
Observe that this measure always lies between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that the full weight of the evidence goes for hypothesis h. While the weight of evidence w looks fike a probability measure (and, in fact, for each fixed h, w(., h) is a probability measure on O), it should not be interpreted as a probability measure. It is simply a way to assign a weight to hypotheses given observations.
For the pnmality example, the set 7-[ of hypotheses is {prime, -~prime}. The observations O are simply the possible outputs of the knowledge algorithm AAlice on the formula prime, namely, {"Yes", "No"}. From the discussion following the description of the example, it follows that Uprime("Yes") -~ 1 #--,prirne("Yes") _< ½ Uprime("No") = 0 U-,pr me("No") >_ ½.
Thus, w("Yes", prime) > ~ and w("Yes", ~prime) < ½. Intuitively, a "Yes" answer to the query prime provides more evidence for the hypothesis prime than the hypothesis ~prime. Similarly, w("No", prime) = 0 and w("No", ~prime) = 1. Thus, an output of "No" to the query prime indicates that the hypothesis -,prime must hold.
This notion of evidence can be generalized to more than two hypotheses. In fact, it is possible to interpret the weight function w as a prescription for how to update a prior probability on the hypotheses into a posterior probability on those hypotheses, after having considered the observations made. We do not focus on these aspects here; see [Halpem and Pucella 2003 ] for more details.
Reliable randomized algorithms
What does a "Yes" answer to a query qo given by an "almost sound" knowledge algonthm tell us about qo? To make this precise, we need to first characterize how reliable the knowledge algorithm In other words, if ~o is true at state s, then an (a,/3)-reliable algorithm says "Yes" to go at s with probability at least a (and hence is fight when it answers "Yes" to query qo with probability at least a); on the other hand, if ~o is false, it says "Yes" with probability at most/3 (and hence is wrong when it answer "Yes" m query qo with probability at most/3). The primality testing knowledge algorithm is (1, ½)-reliable for prime.
We now associate an evidence space over the hypotheses {qo, ~o} with a knowledge algorithm 1i. Let gA~,~, := ({qO, -~qO}, {"Yes", "No", "?"}, #~o, #-,~,). Roughly speaking, #~o("Yes") (resp., #~("No"); #~("?")) is the probability that hi says "Yes" (resp., "No"; "?') to a query ~o in states where qo is true, while #,~o("Yes") (resp., #-,~("No"); #-,~o("?")) is the probability that Ai answers "Yes" (respectively, "No"; "?") to the query qo in states where ~qo is true. This is actually what the definition reduces to when the output of the knowledge algorithm depends only on whether qo is true or false, and not on other details of the state. (This is in fact typically the case; in particular, it is true of the prin~lity-testing algorithm.) However, in general, we take To be able to talk about evidence within the logic, we introduce an operator to capture the evidence provided by the knowledge algorithm of agent i, Evi(~o), read "the weight of evidence that i would get :for ~o if he were to query the knowledge algorithm about qo". Define (M', s, v) ~ Evi(~o) > a if we (h/d(~o, vi, Li(s) ), qo) > a.
We can similarly define (M ~, s, v) ~ Evi(qo) < a. Thus, the Evl operator captures the evidence towards qo given by the answer of i's knowledge algorithm to a query ~o.
We can now capture the relationship between reliable knowledge algorithms and evidence. In other words, if a randomized knowledge algorithm says "Yes", then that provides evidence for qo being true. The weight of evidence depends on the reliability. Similarly, if the randomized knowledge algorithm says "No", there is less evidence in favor of qo being true. Proposition 5.1 becomes interesting in the context of well-known classes of randomized algorithms [Motwani and Raghavan 1995] . An RP (random polynomial-time) algorithm is a polynomialtime randomized algorithm that is (½, 0)-reliable. It thus follows from Proposition 5.1 that if Ai is an RP algorithm, then Xi~o =~ Evi(qo) = 1 and ~Xiqo => Evi(qo) < ½ are both valid in M'. Under mild assumptions on the distribution v (essentially, that it never assigns probability 0 to possible events), Evi(~) = 1 :¢, Kiqo is valid, so that in fact we have Xiqo =~ Kilo, as expected. Similarly, a BPP (bounded-error probabilistic polynomial-time) algorithm is a polynomial-time randomized algorithm that is (43-, ¼)-reliable. Thus, by Proposition 5.1, if Ai is a BPP algorithm, then Xi~o =-~ Evi(qo) > } and ~Xi~ ~ Evi(qo) < ¼ are both valid in M'.
Notice that the result of Proposition 5.1 talks about the evidence that the knowledge algorithm provides for qo. Intuitively, we might expect some kind of relationship between the evidence for and the evidence for ~qo. A plausible relationship would be that high evidence for ~ implies low evidence for ~qo, and low evidence for qo implies high evidence for -~qo. Unfortunately, given the definitions in this section, this is not the case. Evidence for ~ is completely unrelated to evidence for ~qo. Roughly speaking, this is because evidence for qo is measured by looking at the results of the knowledge algorithm when queried for qo, and evidence for -~qo is measured by looking at the results of the knowledge algorithm when queried for ~qo. However, there is nothing in the definition of a knowledge algorithm that says that the answers of the knowledge algorithm to queries qo and ~qo need to be related in any way.
A relationship between evidence for qo and evidence for ~qo can be established by considering knowledge algorithms that are somewhat "well-behaved" with respect to negation. Say that a knowledge algorithm A respects negation if A(-~qo, ~) = "Yes" if and only if k(qo, £) = "No", and A(-~, £) = "No" if and only if A(qo, £) = "Yes". (Similarly for randomized knowledge algorithms.) This is a natural way to define the behavior of a knowledge algorithm on negated formulas. Our first result shows that for knowledge algorithms that respect negation, reliability for qo is related to reliability for ~qo:
Proposition 5.2: If Ai respects negation, then Ai is (a, fl)-reliable for qo in M' if and only if Ai is
(1 -t , 1 -ct)-reliablefor ~qo in M'.
One can check, from the semantics of algorithmic knowledge, that if k/respects negation, then Xiqo =~ -~Xi-~o and Xi-~qo ~ "~Xiqo are valid formulas. Combined with Propositions 5.1 and 5.2, this yields the following result: 
Conclusion
The first goal of this paper is to define the semantics of algorithmic knowledge in the presence of randomized knowledge algorithms. This is done by essentially derandomizing the knowledge algorithms, supplying them with an extra argument representing the random information (for instance, outcomes of coin tosses if the algorithm makes random choices by tossing coins). Using Proposition 5.1, we can precisely characterize the contribution of algorithmic knowledge using randomizx~d knowledge algorithms in terms of evidence. Note that this is the evidence provided by a single query to the knowledge algorithm. Of course, it is always possible to increase the reliability of a knowledge algorithm, by essentially iterating it. (Alternatively, we can equally well compute the cumulative evidence for ~o provided by k queries to the knowledge algorithm, either directly by constructing an appropriate evidence space (the observations are now sequences of "Yes", "No", and "?" of length k) or by using Dempster's Rule of Combination [Shafer 1976 ]. See [Halpern and Pucella 2003 ] for a discussion of combining the evidence of a number of observations, as well combining evidence with prior probabilities.) But the question still remains: what does this evidence tell us? To make this point more definite, suppose that we have a (.999, .001)-reliable algorithm for qo that answers "Yes" to a query qo. What does this tell us about qa? This issue becomes important when ~ is information on which the agent wants to base his actions. To take another example from security, consider an enforcement mechanism used to detect and react to intrusions in a system. Such an enforcement mechanism uses algorithms that analyze the behavior of users and attempt to recognize intruders. While the algorithms may sometimes be wrong, they are typically reliable, in our sense, with some associated probabilities. What actions should the system take based on a report that a user is an intruder?
If we have a probability on the hypotheses, evidence can be used to update this probability. More precisely, as shown in [Halpern and Fagin 1992] , evidence can be viewed as a function from priors to posteriors. For example, if the (cumulative) evidence for n being a prime is a and the prior probability that n is prime is f, then the posterior probability of n being prime (that is, the probability of n being prime in light of the evidence) a straightforward application of Bayes' rule tells us that the posterior probability of n being prime is (a f) / (aft+ (l-a) (l-f)). Therefore, if we have a prior probability on the hypotheses, including the formula ~, then we can decide to perform an action when the posterior probability of qo is high enough. However, what can we do when there is no probability distribution on the hypotheses, as in the primality example at the beginning of this section? The probabilistic interpretation of evidence still lets us guide our decisions. As before, we assume that if the posterior probability of ~ is high enough, we will act as if qo holds. The problem, of course, is that we do not have a prior probability. However, the evidence tells us what prior probabilities we must to be willing to assume for the posterior probability to be high enough.
For example, a "Yes" from a (.999, .001)-reliable algorithm for qo says that as long as the prior probability of qo is at least .01, then the posterior is at least .9. This may be sufficient assurance for an agent to act.
Of course, it: is also possible to treat evidence as primitive, and simply decide to go for the hypothesis for which there is more evidence, or for the hypothesis for which evidence is above a certain threshold. It would in fact be of independent interest to study the properties of a theory of decisions based on a primitive notion of evidence. We leave this to future work.
